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Introduction
In the late 1980s a popular Brazilian television come-
dian presented a skit on his weekly show that con-
sisted of a Brazilian General awaking from a coma he
had entered in the heyday of the military regime circa
1975. Anxious to catch-up with the news of the day
the general was shocked as the nurses and doctors
recounted what was currently happening in the now
democratized country. The humor laid in the way
current events, which had become mundane from the
perspective of viewers, assumed dramatic propor-
tions for the oblivious general. Having lived the day-
to-day process of incremental change the viewers
came to take the status quo for granted, yet the gen-
eral was systematically shocked that activities, situa-
tions and outcomes that were unthinkable in the past
could now have become routine, and that such a
striking reversal of fortune could have taken place for
key public figures. 
If this skit were to be revived today, updated to com-
pare the changes in Brazil from the late-1980s/early-
1990s to the present day, it would have plenty of mate-
rial to astound the new coma-emerging character.
This time around the greater contrast would be on
economic rather than political issues, but the punch
line would still rely on the fact that people who lived
through the gradual process of change tend not to
perceive the magnitude of the total shift that has
taken place. Although almost everyone would agree
that Brazil is economically better off today than it was
20 years ago, we suspect that many people would be
surprised at the breadth, depth and magnitude of the
change when presented with the data. Not only have
salient pathologies which once seemed to be ineradi-
cable features of the economy, such as bouts of hyper-
inflation and external debt, been tamed and beaten,
with the country achieving investment grade status in
2008. In addition a wide variety of other not so
prominent variables have also undergone dramatic
improvement, collectively reinforcing the shift from a
dysfunctional to thriving economy. 
Even when analysts acknowledge the importance of
these changes, there is often skepticism as to whether
the data constitute evidence that Brazil has funda-
mentally and permanently moved towards becoming
a developed economy. After all, history is full of
examples of countries that seemed to have made the
transformation only to slide back down when hit by
the next shock. Brazil is a prime example of such past
disappointments, having been the fastest growing
economy in the world from 1913 to 1980, followed by
near-zero rates of growth for the rest of the century
(Coatsworth 2007). Also, just like we can point to a
list of areas where Brazil improved, we can point to an
equally impressive list of things that have not
improved or have gotten worse. Corruption scandals
of all shapes and sizes continue to pop up periodical-
ly; Brazil remains towards the bottom of educational
achievement tables, and towards the top of inequality
rankings; infrastructure is falling apart; the tax bur-
den is one of the highest in the world; and interest
rates cripple domestic investment. These are all real
and damning characteristics of the current Brazilian
economy and they certainly seem to mitigate the case
made by the list of achievements. 
Despite the seemingly contradictory evidence we will
argue that Brazil is currently undergoing a significant
and permanent move towards becoming a developed
economy. Confronted with strong evidence for both
sides of this issue how can one determine which set of
evidence outweighs the other? In this paper we will
argue that there is no way to make a definitive assess-
ment based on the evidence at hand. There is no
‘smoking gun’ or set of evidence that can definitely
close the case proving the other side wrong. On their
own, none of the achievements reached thus far,
impressive as they may be, is incompatible with this
being another instance of temporary, short-lived
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sufficient to refute the case that the current positive
changes will be profound and permanent. Ultimately
only time will tell which argument best describes the
stage of development Brazil is currently undergoing.
Until then the case must be made by putting forth a
conceptual argument why the current mix of evidence
is compatible with the claim that changes in Brazil
will lead to sustainable economic and political open-
ness, and ultimately sustained economic prosperity.
The conceptual argument must present an interpreta-
tion of the facts and data that passes a preponderance
of evidence standard, as even beyond a reasonable
doubt is unlikely to be achieved at this point.
We proceed in the second section by first presenting
the evidence for and against the claim that Brazil has
undergone deep and sustainable economic and social
progress in the past twenty years, leaving it in a pro-
pitious position to make a transition to developed-
nation status. We argue that although the evidence is
necessarily circumstantial, it is consistent with Brazil
being on a sustainable trajectory to development. In
the third section, in order to provide greater theoret-
ical consistency to our position, we show that the
changes over the past twenty years are crucially
grounded in a deep process of institutional change
that has fundamentally increased open access to
economi and political resources. North, Wallis and
Weingast (2010) have recently argued that increasing
economic and political access is a necessary condi-
tion for the transition to an ‘Open Access Society’
which includes the developed countries in the world.
The underlying institutional changes that generate
open access have eluded most countries in the world
so we will have the burden of
presenting evidence that such
changes in Brazil are real and
sustainably reinforcing. We will
make our case based on the com-
bination of virtuous economic
and political changes towards
greater access to more players
and members of society. 
Economic changes from the
1980s to 2011
Few people would disagree with
the assertion that the Brazilian
economy is currently undergoing
a very positive period. But that is
not the issue that we address. The
essential question is whether this recent performance
is merely a temporary stretch of good results, similar
to that which several other emerging economies are
currently experiencing, or whether it is part of a more
profound process of change, and part of a fundamen-
tal transformation of the country towards a higher
stage of development. Although the scope and mag-
nitude of the changes in the last twenty years have
been dramatic, similar spurts have happened before
and subsequently been reversed, leading to natural
skepticism that this time will be for real. Figure 1
shows the growth rate of GDP per capita in Brazil
from 1950 to 2007 relative to the average of 124 other
countries. The middle line shows the (unweighted)
average of the other countries and the lower and
upper lines show the top and bottom 20th percentile.
The Brazilian rate of growth is shown as diamonds
when it is above the world average and as circles when
it is below.
In the thirty years prior to 1980, Brazil’s rate of eco-
nomic growth exceeded the world average in 21 years
(eleven times above the top 20th percentile) and fell
below the average only nine years. After 1980 it was
below the average in 22 years and above it in only
8 years. The positive results during the early period
fostered a confidence and belief amongst Brazilians
that a country so well endowed with land, natural
resources, climate, geography and a potentially large
internal market could only be destined for greatness.
But the reversal in the second period eroded that
belief, both among experts and the Brazilian public.
The long line of failures and setbacks produced a pro-
found skepticism that the recent good news may not
be sustainable. In this section we will first present evi-
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dence on the positive and negative aspects the
Brazilian ledger of development. In the final section
we provide an argument for our belief that the
changes since 1994 a real and fundamental. Our focus
initially is on economic variables and outcomes, with
political and institutional variables left for the fourth
section as they are part of our explanation for why the
economic changes are well-grounded.
The first point to note is that by looking at GDP fig-
ures alone there is nothing in the recent performance
of the Brazilian economy to suggest that there is any-
thing special going on. Since 1995, GDP growth has
been below the world average in 13 years and above it
in only 3 years. It is true that the high growth years
have been recent: 2007, 2008 and 2010, and also that
forecasts are for high rates of growth in the upcoming
years (IMF 2010). But it is still a rather lackluster per-
formance for a country we claim to be transitioning to
a higher stage of development. So why has Brazil been
attracting so much attention lately? Why is it now,
along with China and India, expected to be a major
source of world economic growth in the coming
decades ushering, by some accounts, the start of a
new world order? Why have predictions of the type
that it “could be one of the world’s five biggest
economies by the middle of this century” (The
Economist, 14 November 2009, 3) reemerged decades
after similar predictions failed so blatantly? 
In order to answer these questions we present the
most conspicuous evidence for the case that the
transformation in Brazil is sustainable and real. The
idea is not to give a fully integrated account that
explains the evidence in detail and weighs the differ-
ent interpretations. It is instead to provide a barrage
of evidence that together reinforce each other so
that their simultaneous occurrence reduces the
probability that, in such a scenario, that claim could
be wrong. Subsequently a different set of evidence,
which sometimes includes the same data used before
but with different interpretations, will be provided
so as to consider the counterargument that current
economic growth in Brazil is fragile and cannot be
sustained.
Although we do not intend to fully integrate all the
different strands of evidence, we will give the presen-
tation some structure by considering the following
perspective: if Brazil is in fact on the path to a higher
stage of development, then we should expect to see
changes in the past one or two decades in several areas
that are essential for growth, especially those where
Brazil has traditionally been particularly deficient.
One of the main themes in the Brazilian development
literature has always been the paradox of why a coun-
try that had achieved such impressive economic
growth before the mid-1970s was thereafter incapable
of recovering that past performance (Bacha and
Bonelli 2005; Blyde et al. 2008; Hausmann 2008;
Pessoa 2006). Scholars in this literature presume that
the growth potential is there for Brazil, but that there
are different constraints that hold it back. Some con-
straints are more binding than others and collectively
they restrict the growth potential from being realized.
We use this perspective as a guide for the presentation
of our evidence. For our claim to hold that Brazil is
on a positive trajectory we will show that significant
progress has been made in those areas traditionally
held as causes of Brazilian chronic backwardness. It is
not necessary that Brazil has fully solved each of these
constraints, but rather that significant strides forward
have been made and that further progress is likely to
persist. In absolute terms some of these areas might
still present significant deficiencies, for example edu-
cation, but our interest is not so much in the snapshot
of the current situation as it is in the likelihood that
this problem will be addressed in a timely manner so
as not to become a roadblock for growth. 
So what are the main constraints and deficiencies that
are typically credited with holding back Brazilian eco-
nomic growth? There is no lack of candidates. Some
of the major limitations include: poor human capital,
low savings, poor infrastructure, inefficient and exces-
sive taxation, macroeconomic instability, poor busi-
ness environment, highly concentrated income distri-
bution, rigid labor markets, informality, weak rule of
law/property rights, and corruption (Bacha and
Bonelli 2005; Blyde et al. 2008; Hausmann 2008;
Pessoa 2006). The problems appear to be so pervasive,
deeply rooted and impervious to past attempts at
tackling them, that for many analysts there is a belief
that the problems are insurmountable, a belief that is
especially strong among those who lived through the
process. Our goal is to show evidence that much has
changed in recent times and often in quite unexpected
ways, and areas. In some policy areas complete turn-
arounds have taken place and in other areas only ini-
tial improvements. Some old flaws and vices that were
typically thought to be an inextricable part of the
Brazilian way of being and doing things have disap-
peared or been diluted. Similarly, some surprising new
strengths and comparative advantages have emerged.
Clearly there are still numerous problems and need for
further change. Yet our hope is that the collectiveweight of the data presented substantially changes the
reader’s assessment of the probability of our position
that a transformation is underway in the Brazilian
society.
A good place to start is by noting that the poor per-
formance for most of the 1990s and into the
21st century in terms of rates of GDP growth is not
due to a lack of growth opportunities. On the con-
trary, given that Brazilian interest rates have system-
atically been among the highest in the world in the
past two decades is a consequence of the need to
avoid demand from exceeding supply and leading to
inflation. Hausmann (2008) argues that it is the lack
of savings to fund these repressed investments that is
the main ‘chain that holds Brazil back’, with the
implication that changes that increase savings will
automatically be reflected in higher growth levels.
The view that Brazil is set for a long period of
growth relies on the capital constraint being relaxed.
Given that public savings in Brazil are negative,
increasing the availability of capital requires that
foreign capital increases along with domestic sav-
ings. At several points in the past Brazil has had
access to foreign capital, but never in a sustained
manner. In this sense the achievement of ‘investment
grade’in 2008 is crucially important. It not only pro-
vides a weighty confirmation by skittish global
financial markets of the main point of this paper but
it has also opened the door to considerable new
sources of capital inflows. Since 2008 the levels of
foreign direct investment have shot up with a record
inflow of 48 billion US dollars in 2010, making
Brazil the 12th country in the world in terms of
stock of foreign direct investment (UNCTAD 2011).
Also, by the end of 2010 Brazil had a historical high
of over 260 billion US dollars in foreign reserves,
more than covering its foreign debt obligations. Such
a situation would have been unfathomable a mere
10 years earlier when the excess of foreign debt over
reserves reached its record level at 205 billion US
dollars. Brazilians, who have typically viewed the
foreign debt as one of the greatest symbols of their
country’s submission to foreign capitalist domi-
nance, have not failed to see the irony in the fact that
in 2010 Brazil became for the first time a creditor of
the IMF. Similarly, domestic savings have been
increasing in Brazil partly due to large increases in
export revenues. 
The increased availability of foreign inflows of capital
and domestic savings has already translated into
increased economic activity, record low unemploy-
ment, and 7.5 percent GDP growth in 2010. To sus-
tain this performance it is necessary that current inter-
national circumstances, such as high commodity
prices and foreign direct investment availability,
remain fairly stable, which seems a reasonable
assumption given that there appears to be no inherent
limitations on demand for Brazilian exports, especial-
ly in the new world order that seems to be emerging
with Asia being the leading source of demand.
But will the country be able to continue increasing its
supply of goods and services in terms of quantity,
quality and innovation in order to satisfy both the for-
eign and the rapidly growing internal market? Several
of the old constraints hold the potential to delay or
maybe even derail these ambitions, the most direct of
these being a backward agricultural sector, lack of
qualified human capital and poor infrastructure. Let
us take these in turn to see how they have evolved in
the past two decades.
During the 1980s the agricultural sector in Brazil
was so highly dysfunctional in so many aspects that
few analysts would have predicted the changes that
would ensue in the next 20 years. Land reform and
rural labor legislation in the 1960s increased the
price of labor, and perverse subsidies reduced the
cost of mechanization, leading to a productive
structure that defied the country’s natural factor
endowments (Rezende 2006). The upshot was a con-
centrated and mechanized set of large productive
farms co-existing with large under-utilized holdings,
and hordes of landless peasants. Low productivity
amid much rural poverty prompted an exodus of
labor. Weak property rights to land retarded invest-
ment and innovation, and impeded tenancy con-
tracts closing one of the most traditional avenues
for individual progress in agriculture (Alston and
Mueller 2010). Well-intentioned but misguided land
reform policy resulted in one of the world’s most
massive series of land conflicts, spreading violence
throughout the countryside and further hindering
production and productivity (Alston, Libecap and
Mueller 1999 and 2010). The government viewed
agriculture not as a leading source of economic
growth but rather a supporting sector whose pur-
pose was to provide some inputs that the more mod-
ern parts of the economy needed to push the coun-
try forward.
This situation led to a standard view into the early
1990s among analysts of Brazilian agriculture that
without structural change through land reform and
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more government involvement in the form of subsi-
dies, purchases and price controls, the sector could
not be truly modernized. Years later no such structur-
al change had taken place. The government redistrib-
uted a considerable amount of land but in a wasteful
manner and without substantively changing the sec-
tor; a small proportion of all farms are still responsi-
ble for most of the production. In the 1990s the gov-
ernment phased out subsidies and now the govern-
ment’s direct involvement in agriculture is minimal.
Yet, under the radar screen and contrary to most
prognoses, Brazil has become a major agricultural
powerhouse. By 2009 Brazil was a an agricultural
superpower in production with the following world
rankings in parentheses: sugar (1); coffee (1); orange
juice (1); beef (2); soybeans (2); chickens (3); pork (4);
corn (4); and cotton (5), as well as a significant pro-
ducer and exporter of a very large range of other agri-
cultural products. 
Brazil also has considerable growth potential in agri-
culture because it has more available arable land than
any other country, part beyond the current agricultur-
al frontier and part in the form of degraded pasture
that can be put to more productive uses, all without
threatening the Amazon rainforest. Complementing
its land endowment, Brazil is one of the best endowed
countries in terms of water. On the energy side, biofu-
els, derived from sugarcane are a major domestic
source of energy, and there is still a huge potential
export market that is bound to grow as Brazilian
ethanol is cheaper and more environmentally friendly
than other existing biofuels. Part of the success is due
to domestic research and innovation that created
more productive procedures and varieties for
Brazilian conditions, defying some long established
perceptions of what can and cannot be grown in dif-
ferent regions of the country. Given the current
endowments of Brazil we are not overly optimistic to
imagine that the impressive changes in Brazilian agri-
culture are only beginning and that agriculture will be
a major source of growth for the country in the com-
ing decades. 
One objection to our prognosis is that the country´s
already deficient infrastructure will significantly
raise costs not only for agriculture but for econom-
ic activity more generally. A decaying road net-
work, crowded airports, increasingly frequent
blackouts, clogged ports and generally over-
stretched urban infrastructure already hinder the
production and movement of goods, services and
people. As the rate of economic growth picks up
pace these bottlenecks will become an even greater
drag on the economy. Given that there has been so
little investment in infrastructure in the past two
decades, why would one expect this to be forthcom-
ing now? The answer to this question is important
because once we have determined what has been the
impediment for infrastructure investment in the
past we can assess whether it is likely to continue
blocking investments in the future. We argue that
the current state of infrastructure was a deliberate
choice made in the context of trade-offs that have
yielded compensating benefits but that the con-
straints on investment in infrastructure are now less
severe and indeed there appears to be a growing
consensus that investment in infrastructure should
be a priority. 
Alston, Melo, Mueller and Pereira (2010) argue that
infrastructure has been the prototypical residual poli-
cy in Brazil in the past decade. The government goal
was first to ensure a fiscal balance which meant sus-
pending expenditures in policy spaces. We argue that
the costs imposed by the increasingly subpar infra-
structure contributed importantly towards assuring
the monetary stability that has been the foundation of
the economic and social transformation in Brazil. In
short the costs of prior investments in infrastructure
costs were, in a sense, ‘not worth it’. Now that fiscal
and monetary stability are the norm – remember the
investment grade status of Brazilian debt – and with
Brazil predicted to experience several years of higher
rates of growth, this tension between macro-stability
and infrastructure may be obsolete. We maintain that
the shadow price of infrastructure services and the
consolidation of Brazil’s fiscal maturity will allow for
increased government investment in infrastructure,
with the funding partially coming from greater private
and foreign investment.
The government has initiated new rules that decouple
infrastructure investment from primary surplus
accounting. In addition the government elevated
greater investment in infrastructure as a central objec-
tive through its Program for Growth Acceleration and
the national development bank (BNDES) has put its
weight behind investment in infrastructure. Part of
the impetus for greater investment has come in prepa-
ration for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in
2016. Our argument is that the circumstances that led
to poor infrastructure in the past have changed and
that the new government under President Dilma
Rousseff has put better infrastructure at the top of
her priorities for spending. Of all the constraints that the Brazilian economy
faces, a deficient educational sector leading to a
shortage of human capital appears to many analysts
as the most severe. Since the end of the 19th century,
and continuing to today, Brazil has been below the
Latin American literacy average. Better delivery of
educational services is clearly a major obstacle for
the country’s ability to sustain higher rates of growth
and a more distinguished role in international
affairs. The list of ills that afflict education in Brazil
run the gamut: low quality of instruction, weak cur-
riculum, short hours for the school day, absenteeism
by students and teachers, poorly paid and motivated
teachers, poorly educated and non-involved parents,
child labor, and low, erratic and misplaced funding.
The title of a volume edited by Birdsall and Sabot
(1996) for the Inter-American Development Bank,
as well as the title of the first chapter, summarize
well the state of Brazilian education in the mid-
1990s: Opportunity Forgone: Education in Brazil and
Chapter 1 – ‘Education in Brazil: Playing a Bad
Hand Badly’.
The litany of problems and deficiencies in education
chronicled by Birdsall, Sabot and other scholars are
still present in Brazil today, and the ubiquitous preoc-
cupation with education is certainly warranted.
However, what is important for our argument is not
the current level of education quality and attainment
as much as the direction and pace in which it is head-
ing. Since 1996 the government has initiated major
reforms to the educational system along several dif-
ferent fronts, with the result that, despite the doom-
sayers, there has been significant improvement and a
promise of more to come. Our assessment can be seen
by contrasting the chapter on Brazil in 1996 by
Birdsall and Sabot to a recent OECD (2010) study on
‘Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in
Education’, which included Brazil as a leader in
reform. The OECD study stressed that in Brazil
coherent and innovative reforms have started address-
ing the underlying causes of poor education in ways
that promise significant long-term changes.
The reforms addressed several different dimensions of
the educational system and at several different levels –
federal, state and municipal (OECD 2010). Funding,
which is constitutionally hardwired, is high by world
standards but the productivity of the expenditures has
been improved and made more equitable. The govern-
ment created several new funds to assure resources for
different educational purposes: they increased teacher
salaries, especially in the poorer regions, and empha-
sized better training for teachers; government man-
dated local education councils increased community
participation; conditional cash transfers have been
extremely successful and have been expanded to cover
more than 11 million families, contributing to reduce
absenteeism, repetition and child labor; and comple-
tion rates have also improved. With school attendance
now nearly universal, government has directed efforts
to increase the length of the school day and the school
year. The government also extended the number of
years in the curriculum to 12 years. 
Brazil has long had one of the highest returns to edu-
cation in the world, which is a direct consequence of
the unmet demand for human capital. This market
signal is clearly perceived by the population which has
now found it easier to respond as education availabil-
ity and quality has improved. At the higher educa-
tional level, the number of private universities has
increased dramatically as have the number of students
in public universities, with both forms of expansion
spurred by purposively government created policies.
Today Brazil boasts half a million graduates and
10,000 PhDs every year and the number of scientific
papers has increased with Brazil’s share in the world
from 1.7 percent to 2.7 percent since 2002 (The
Economist, 6 January 2001).
What is more important than the impressive albeit
insufficient results that have been attained so far is the
change in governance over education policy. There
has long been a consensual recognition of the key role
of education, as expressed in the hardwiring of edu-
cation expenditures in 1988 Constitution. On its own,
hardwiring did not ensure that expenditures would be
effective. An important change has been the willing-
ness to measure, evaluate and benchmark perfor-
mance at all different levels, creating accountability
and incentives for improvement, effort and innova-
tion. As in most countries, this type of policy was met
with initial resistance from teachers, students, parents,
unions, and political parties that feared the new bur-
dens and requirements that such a change might
impose on their constituents. Nevertheless, as the gov-
ernment pushed through the new policies, earlier
opposition subsided. The various evaluation schemes
began to be seen as providing valuable feedback that
was eventually used not only by policymakers but also
by parents and consumers to pressure for better qual-
ity of education. 
We stress that this change in mentality is important
because it creates an environment where improvement
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is continually sought and incentives start to break the
traditional resistance to competition and meritocracy.
Long gone are the days in the 1980s when the only
ranking of university departments available to stu-
dents deciding on what to study was the Playboy
ranking, published once a year. Today there are
indices and rankings for several different levels and
dimensions of departments and universities across
Brazil. Not only are the rankings used by students but
the government has used the rankings to change poli-
cy in ways that reward what works and to locate and
reform low performers. The new mentality of educa-
tional excellence, together with the federal structure of
Brazilian education provides an environment where
experimentation and innovation are fostered. It is thus
the magnitude of the changes in the ways in which
government(s) make education policy, more than the
actual achievements in terms of measurable statistics
that provide our optimism that education will not be
a critical constraint to economic growth. Rather we
see the advances in education as a crucial input to sus-
taining growth in the coming years.
However one may choose to define what constitutes
an improvement in economic development, at some
point it is necessary to have progress in reducing
poverty which most likely in turn will reduce income
inequality. So even if one accepts our position that
changes in the last two decades have surprisingly and
fundamentally improved the outlook regarding capi-
tal availability, agriculture, infrastructure and educa-
tion, there may still be some skepticism whether these
changes were merely isolated and transient events, or
part of a more systemic process of development. In
the next section we will show the institutional founda-
tion that connects these changes, but first we show
that the changes in poverty in Brazil are quantitative-
ly significant and qualitatively unprecedented.
Poverty rates in Brazil fell by half from 1993 to 2009,
declining from 43 percent to 21 percent of the popu-
lation. Extreme poverty rates fell even further from
20 percent to 7 percent. Though impressive, one could
argue that throughout Brazilian history there have
been spurts of poverty reductions, and that they have
simultaneously taken place in other countries, per-
haps driven by high commodity prices. However, a
crucial difference this time is that both decreases in
inequality and economic growth have produced a
decline in poverty (Barros et al. 2007). This is much
different than the fall in poverty in China which has
been accompanied by a significant increase in
inequality. The same is true of the recent growth in
Russia, and India – rates of inequality have increased,
though less than in other developing countries
(Bardhan 2009). In Brazil the Gini coefficient of
income inequality has been falling nearly every year
since 1995, dropping from 0.60 in 1995 to 0.54 in
2009. Though this is still a very high level of concen-
tration, a systematic fall over such a prolonged period
is unprecedented in Brazil, a country historically
impervious to reductions in wealth and income
inequality. The main determinants of this improve-
ment include real increases in the minimum wage,
lower wage heterogeneity and various governmental
transfer programs, and at a more fundamental level
the end of endemic inflation. 
Leaving the social and political causes and conse-
quences of these changes for the next section we want
to stress here the important economic impact of the
incorporation of a massive contingent of consumers
into the domestic market. From 2002 to 2010 the class
of citizens that earns from 900 US dollars to 3,000 US
dollars a month, known in Brazil as the C class, cor-
responding to about 49 percent of the population, has
gone from making 27 percent of all purchases of
durable goods to 45 percent (Folha de São Paulo,
15 December 2010). This means millions of people
making first time purchases of computers, washing
machines, refrigerators, automobiles, and other
durable goods, along with the purchase of non-
durable goods and services such as airline tickets, and
restaurant meals. A greater access to credit has fueled
much of the consumption. The resulting increase in
the extent of the market is much more consequential
than the mere expansion which the numbers suggest,
as a larger market may stimulate greater productivity
and growth potential. The vigorous internal market
has already been credited with allowing Brazil to sail
smoothly through the recent global depression.
In the pages above we provided evidence of improve-
ment in just a few important aspects of the Brazilian
economy and society. We could expand the list con-
siderably. Brazil has recently discovered massive oil
reserves that will make it potentially one of the
world’s top producers. The new phenomenon of a
Brazilian transnational company has become a reality
with significant increases in foreign/domestic partner-
ships in recent years. Regulatory governance has
improved, not only in infrastructure, but also finan-
cial regulation, bankruptcy laws, labor markets, envi-
ronment and other areas (Correa et al. 2007).
Informality is declining as is urban violence in most
cities. We anticipate that preparation for the WorldCup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016 will further cat-
alyze change.
No matter how compelling the evidence that we have
shown, it is not sufficient to close the case that Brazil
is undergoing a fundamental change in its economic
and societal growth trajectory. For each of the areas
discussed above counterarguments could be made
pointing out the limitations and hazards for the
Brazilian economy. Education is still highly deficient,
and the current rate of improvement may still be too
slow. Income inequality improvements may be just the
low hanging fruit. The oil discoveries may be a curse
rather than a blessing. Additionally several other
points which we have not touched upon might be
brought up such as corruption, excessive tax burdens,
and social security commitments that will hamper
growth. We take these counter-points seriously, but
they cannot definitively refute our argument. We have
not argued that all improvement has occurred in all
policy areas or that all the needed improvement has
taken place in the areas that have moved in the right
direction. Note that even in highly developed coun-
tries there are always underperforming sectors and a
myriad of constraints on growth – much of the devel-
oped world is awash in debt and many suffer from a
skewed demographic profile with too many people
leaving the labor force and an insufficient number
entering. Furthermore, successful development does
not proceed in a smooth monotonic pace, but is rather
a highly complex process that moves in fits and starts,
waxing and waning on different margins in unpre-
dictable ways. We simply argue that Brazil has wit-
nessed significant and fundamental changes in the
past two decades, commencing with the stabilization
of the currency in 1994. Although the evidence we
have presented is largely circumstantial, the more evi-
dence that points in the same direction the stronger is
our inferential chain of reasoning. We maintain that
our evidence cannot be simply due to a wave of high
commodity prices and there have been underlying
fundamental changes in Brazilian society grounded in
significant changes in institutions. In the next section
we argue that institutional changes are the key reason
for believing that the process of economic, political
and social development is sustainable.
The institutional underpinnings of Brazil’s 
transformation
Economic performance of the sort that Brazil expe-
rienced in recent years can be driven by a series of
factors: favorable external circumstances; enlight-
ened leaders; or even by sheer chance. But if these
are the root causes of the improvements, the good
run will be temporary. For improved performance to
be sustained, it is necessary that there be more fun-
damental structural changes that produce forces and
incentives that buttress past achievements and foster
future development. One obvious, though elusive,
way to achieve sustained development is to establish
institutions that produce an environment where:
governments and policymakers face incentives and
constraints to seek the public good rather than pri-
vate gain; and where secure property rights and
endemic rule of law create conditions for individuals
and organizations to invest, transact, innovate and
prosper. In this section we argue that Brazil is under-
going such a process of institutional change, and
that this has been the most important underlying
determinant of the economic and social develop-
ments discussed above.
Our claim may seem counterintuitive, given the over-
whelming powers of the president in Brazil and that
strong presidential powers have not historically been
associated with rule of law and democracy in Latin
America. Alston and Mueller (2006) show that the
Brazilian executive possesses a series of prerogatives,
instruments and political currencies that allow the
president to set the political agenda and generally get
what she wants. Though such powers more often than
not lead to outcomes with shades of tyranny and
autocracy, in Brazil, accompanying institutions since
1995 have ensured that the powers of the president
will generally be used for the common good rather
than for personal gain or that of private groups.1 The
greatest manifestation of presidential power being
used for the public good has been the unrelenting zeal
with which the government has pursued monetary
stability. President Cardoso initiated the Plano Real as
finance minister in 1994 and it pulled the economy
out of a history of recurring inflation including a
crippling 10 year run of hyperinflation following
1985. Maintaining low inflation requires a level of fis-
cal discipline that runs counter to any politician’s nat-
ural instincts as it necessitates policies and decisions
that holds enormous upfront costs and delivers only
diffuse future benefits. Choosing enlightened leaders
CESifo Forum 1/2011 44
Focus
1 We are aware that this in no small claim and we do not have the
space to defend it fully in this paper. For this we refer the reader to
Alston, Melo, Mueller and Pereira (2008). Similarly we will not have
the space to go into the deeper question of how and why such insti-
tutional arrangements emerged, which is the subject of our ongoing
research: Alston, Melo, Mueller and Pereira, Power, Beliefs and
Institutions: Development in the Modern World, Brazil – 1960–2010,
book manuscript in progress.CESifo Forum 1/2011 45
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initially may be necessary but it is not sufficient to
ensure the sustained required restraint. In Brazil, even
the left-wing Workers’Party under President Lula and
now President Dilma Rousseff, fully embraced con-
servative fiscal and monetary policies once they came
to power. President Lula was elected in part on a man-
date to push social justice through aggressive but
unsustainable redistributive powers but he quickly
abandoned this agenda in favor of following in the
footsteps of Cardoso. This turnabout suggests that
there are deeper incentives and constraints influenc-
ing the exercise of strong presidential powers.
One of the key incentives for the president to main-
tain macro-orthodoxy is a deep understanding by the
electorate, acquired through experience, of the evils
of inflation and the precedence that this issue must
take over other things they may also value highly.
This understanding has become engrained in the
form of a widely held belief which resulted in power-
ful inducements for presidents since the 1990s, what-
ever their personal ideologies, to prioritize monetary
and fiscal stability. Given the nature of presidential
powers, the responsibility for any lapse back to infla-
tion could never be credibly shrugged off by the pres-
ident, and for the past fifteen years revealed behavior
has been exemplary, with some license to following
the political business cycle. A second powerful incen-
tive for careful monetary and fiscal policy is the dis-
cipline imposed by globalized financial markets that
would instantly punish evidence of lax behavior.
Although every country is subject to this form of
market scrutiny, Brazil is particularly susceptible
given its high integration in international financial
and goods markets.
In addition to the incentive placed on presidents since
the success of the Plano Real, political choices are
also highly constrained by a series of checks and bal-
ances that have evolved in the past few years. The
underlying characteristic of these constraints is a
belief that arose in reaction to the authoritarian ways
of the military dictatorship (1964–1985). This belief
rests on an aversion to despotism, exclusion, oppres-
sion, censorship, inequality, disenfranchisement and
other undemocratic manifestations. This anti-author-
itarian and inclusive democratic belief has been the
bedrock for many changes that have taken place in
Brazil, both at institutional and policy levels, with
both desirable as well as regrettable consequences.
The Constitution of 1988 epitomized the belief in
anti-authoritarianism and inclusion. The constitution
enshrined these just and noble aspirations often with
no concern for economic reality. One example was the
extension of social security benefits to millions of
rural workers who had not contributed to its funding,
in a rare instance of redistribution towards some of
the poorest members of society, yet with a big impact
on the fiscal deficit. Whether one approves of any
given policy or political choice, our argument is that
the beliefs in anti-authoritarianism and inclusion have
significantly influenced the general nature of policies
and institutions since democratization in 1985. 
In particular the beliefs prompted the establishment
of checks and balances creating an important net-
work of counterweights to the powers of the execu-
tive. The Supreme Court, for example, despite many
faults, is highly independent and systematically rules
against the president’s interest. Similarly there are
other organizations such as district attorneys and the
Courts of Accounts that have increasingly played the
role of watchdog, not only acting directly as veto
players but also by providing platforms through
which other actors can pursue their rights (Mueller
2010; Melo, Pereira and Figueiredo 2009). The belief
in participation, inclusion, transparency and
accountability has given rise to numerous institution-
alized and informal entry points for different groups
to participate in the policymaking process, giving rise
to a rich tapestry of social groups, associations,
NGOs and other participatory groups in civil society.
Similarly, the belief against any form of censorship
or lack of transparency contributed to the rise of a
highly combative and high quality press. Despite
some ownership concentration of media conglomer-
ates and the general low level of education, it is unde-
niable that the freedom of the press provides a key
check on politicians at all levels in Brazil and spurs a
healthy debate on public issues. Though democracy is
still a relatively new experience for most Brazilians
alive today, sufficient elections have been successfully
held to uproot the old cynicism born from the
crooked political practices of the past. High levels of
political competition with frequent and peaceful
turnover of those in power including the demise of
formerly perennial oligarchic families, provides
strong inducements for those in office to pursue the
public interest.
As in the previous section, here we have enumerated a
series of positive institutional changes that have tran-
spired in Brazil in the past two decades. We posit that
the economic and social virtuous changes chronicled
in the previous sections resulted from the institutions
and beliefs that emerged. Yet here again a skepticcould easily provide a list of wrongdoings, injustice
and absurdities from current public life as counterar-
guments to our claim of virtuous institutional change.
For some, a glance at the morning paper is sufficient
to show the naivety of our portrayal of Brazilian pol-
itics. Yet once again we insist on the point that the evi-
dence is circumstantial on both sides of the ledger but
that the preponderance of evidence is consistent with
our view. After all, doesn’t the morning paper even in
highly developed countries stand the hair on one’s
neck? Especially with current events it is difficult to
sort out which events will be consequential and which,
despite their current sound and fury will prove irrele-
vant as time passes (Gavin 2010). In the end only his-
tory will prove whether our forecast about the trajec-
tory of Brazilian society is accurate. By developing a
logically consistent account of the economic and
social changes in Brazil, and their ties to the underly-
ing institutional changes, our goal in this essay was to
convince the reader that this time Brazilian develop-
ment is for real. 
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